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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Certainly the exemption statute is no more inequitable to the
federal government than any other statute the state might pass
changing the enforcement procedures for creditors' claims.
In United States v. Bosman, 363 U.S. 237 (1960) the Supreme
Court gave recognition to the fact that Congress has not provided
a system to supplement or replace the state procedure governing
claim enforcement, and that until they do the system provided by the
state is the most desirable to follow. This has always been the
general rule. Therefore, if you look to the state system of collection
you will be under the same rules that apply to the rest of the state
creditors in this regard.
As long as the federal government is looking to the state law to
determine priorities and rights of creditors, once their claim has at-
tached, the holding of the principal case must follow. West Virginia,
having created an equity by providing for the beneficiary an exemption
of certain insurance proceeds, must be considered one of the states
that comes within the law stated by the Supreme Court in the
principal case.
Boyd Lee Warner, II
Property-Joint Tenancy in Joint Bank Accounts
P, the committee for W, an incompetent, sought to recover money
representing the proceeds of two bank accounts alleged to be wrong-
fully withheld by D. W's husband, H, had opened an account in the
name of H and W "payable to either or the survivor." H subsequently
closed this account and opened a new one in the name of H and D, H's
son. H died shortly thereafter. The lower court dismissed the pro-
ceeding and P appealed. Held, reversed, new trial granted. The with-
drawal was held not to have destroyed the joint tenancy. The court
held that evidence would have to be introduced to determine whether
or not the presumption created by the statute that a joint tenancy
was intended was rebutted. If not, W would be entitled to her moiety
of the account (one half) or to all of the account if the proof
established that the closing of the account was not voluntarily and
understandingly made by H, i.e., that fraud, undue influence, or lack
of mental capacity resulted in H's closing the account. Bricker v.
Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d 22, 241 N.Y.S. 2d 413, 191 N.E.2d 795 (1963).
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The New York court, in the case under comment, sets out what
appears to be a rather appealing rule: That, as to money left in the
account at the death of the depositor, there is a conclusive presump-
tion that a joint tenancy was intended; but as to funds withdrawn
prior to the death of the depositor, the presumption is rebuttable.
Such a withdrawal does not destroy the tenancy, rather only allows or
"opens the door to" competent testimony that would show that no
joint tenancy was intended to be created.
Special problems arise when the joint tenancy concerns money as
distinguished from some other kind of property less fluid in nature,
such as land or a valuable painting. As a practical matter, it would
doubtless prove quite difficult in many cases to show the flow of
deposits and withdrawals concerning each tenant and to ascertain
the interest each tenant has in the amount on deposit at any given
time. State Bd. of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989
(1948); 10 AM. Jom. 2d BANKS § 374 (1963). It is the realization
of these practical difficulties that prompts one to speculate as to
whether the West Virginia court would accept the New York rule that
a cotenant who withdraws more than his moiety is liable to the other.
Perhaps because money is so susceptible of division by the parties
themselves, the courts should deem it unnecessary to divide the money
for them, as it does, for example, in the case of land, by means of
partition.
The concept of the creation of property interests by deposit of
funds in a joint bank account has rested on several theories, mainly
trust, gift, contract, and joint tenancy. Annot., 135 A.L.R. 993
(1941). For purposes of this comment, discussion will be limited
primarily to the joint tenancy theory in considering what effects such
a deposit have.
Many states have statutes providing that the deposit of funds in
the name of a depositor and another payable to either or the survivor
has the effect of creating a joint tenancy as to the amounts so de-
posited. Annot., 149 A.L.R. 879, 893 (1944). Such a statute may
create a conclusive presumption of the depositor's intent to vest title
in the co-depositor, Maurice v. Coleman, 56 Cal. App. 2d 340, 132
P.2d 511 (1942), or a presumption rebuttable by competent evidence
to the contrary, Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451
(1958).
In Lett v. Twentieth St. Bank, 138 W. Va. 759, 77 S.E.2d 813
(1953), decedent husband deposited a substantial amount in D bank
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in a savings account in the names of the decedent and his wife.
Decedent made a subsequent deposit and later added the name of his
sister, P, as a depositor. P was the survivor of the three depositors
and relied on W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 8, § 23 (Michie 1961), as
entitling her to the whole amount in the savings account:
"When a deposit is made by any person in the name of such
depositor and another person and in form to be paid to either,
or the survivor of them, such deposit, and any additions thereto
made, by either such persons, upon the making thereof, shall
become the property of such persons as joint tenants ...."
It was presumed that all the money deposited in the account had
been owned by the husband, and it was not shown that he had
intended to create survivorship for the benefit of his sister. The court
held for P, stating that, although the statute was enacted to protect
bank institutions, it also created property rights in the depositors.
It found that the statute restored the element of survivorship as to
joint bank accounts and that P was entitled to the full amount re-
maining in the account plus interest accrued thereon "by the plain,
unambiguous provisions of Code 31-8-23." The court also indicated,
apparently by way of dictum, that after decedent's death, either the
wife or sister could have withdrawn the entire amount of the account.
This indication could take on special signifiance in the light of the
discussion below.
The question as to rights of survivorship in West Virginia in the
money deposited in a joint bank account appears to be clearly
answered by the court's interpretation of the statute in the Lett case.
Interesting questions still linger, however, and these relate principally
to the property rights created in the joint tenants inter vivos, that is,
apart from the question of survivorship. Has the depositor not made
an inter vivos gift to his cotenant of an interest in the money he de-
posits in the joint account? Is it a gift, subject to the right of the
donor to draw out all the substance of the gift? Are moiety interests
created, as in the New York case? These questions do not appear to
have been answered by the West Virginia court. The fact that such
questions remain unanswered was recognized in Stacy, Tax Conse-
quences of Joint Ownership of Property, 61 W. VA. L. REv. 167
(1958). There, the author pointed out that the deposit of funds by
one to a joint account offered no objective test of the ownership of
the funds, and indicated the uncertainties in this area as to whether a
[Vol. 66254
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joint tenancy with all its implications is created, or as to whether the
second depositor would have rights against the first.
The fact that the New York statute upon which the decision in the
principal case turns is practically identical with the West Virginia
statute alluded to in the Lett case allows certain suppositions to be
made. N.Y. BANKING LAw § 239. The only substantial difference is
that an additional sentence is appended to the New York statute, pro-
viding that, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, a deposit to a
joint account will be conclusive evidence of the depositor's intent to
vest title in the other depositor. It has been held, however, as in-
dicated above, that as to funds withdrawn prior to the death of the
first depositor, there is merely a rebuttable presumption that a joint
account was created. In re Creekmore's Estate, 1 N.Y.2d 284, 135
N.E.2d 193 (1956); In re Porianda's Estate, 256 N.Y. 423, 176 N.E.
826 (1931).
In Walsh v. Keenan, 293 N.Y. 573, 59 N.E.2d 409 (1944), A
moved to the home of P, her sister, and had A's bank account changed
to include the name of P, although A at all times retained exclusive
possession of the passbook and complete dominion over the account.
A later closed out the account and opened another account with D.
The court held that D was entitled to the funds, that the presumption
that a deposit in the names of a depositor and another may be, and
was, overcome by proof. Especially significant was the court's dis-
cussion of the two statutory presumptions, originally set forth in
Moskowitz v. Morrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929). The
first presumption is that a deposit made as indicated above becomes
the property of the parties as joint tenants, and it is not conclusive and
may be overcome by proof that the depositor had no intention of
creating a joint tenancy. The second presumption is that title passes to
the survivor, which is not rebuttable by proof, but is limited to money
still on deposit and not withdrawn by either party during life. Con-
sidering this first presumption as it might relate to the Lett case,
perhaps the fact that the husband in that case apparently gave his
sister, P, an interest in the money already deposited in his and his
wife's names, without having the wife join in the transfer, would serve
as evidence that a joint tenancy was not intended when the deposits
were made.
A New York court has indicated that where an intention to
create a joint tenancy is unquestioned, the statute raises a conclusive
1964]
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presumption that title passes to the survivor. In re Timko, 150 Misc.
701, 270 N.Y.S. 323 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
It is informative to look to other jurisdictions to see how they
have resolved the problems relating to the property interests created
by a deposit in a joint account. As indicated above, some courts are
able to rely on joint tenancy statutes designed to deal with joint bank
accounts, while other jurisdictions have no such statutes and look to
gift, trust, or contract theories as giving rise to joint interests.
The law in Pennsylvania with regard to the rights of joint tenants
was set forth in Glessner v. Security-Peoples Trust Co., 166 Pa. Super.
566, 72 A.2d 817 (1950). There, decedent opened a joint account
payable either to himself or to X or the survivor. The court upheld
the finding of the lower court that decedent had made an immediate
gift to X by contributing the sum to a joint account. It was indicated
that it was necessary to determine whether at the time the joint tenancy
was created decedent intended to make an inter vivos gift.
A New Jersey court has held that if one of the depositors exercised
his power to withdraw the whole fund, he becomes accountable to
his fellow depositor for the latter's share. In re Manfredini's Estate,
13 N.J. Super. 258, 80 A.2d 445 (App. Div. 1951).
A fairly recent South Carolina case has held that the fact that one
party could withdraw the entire amount without liability on the part
of the bank did not sanction the destruction of a co-interest, and that
such withdrawal, to the extent that it exceeded the withdrawing party's
moiety, amounted to conversion. Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613,
118 S.E.2d 684 (1961).
In Perkins v. City Nat'l Bank, 253 Iowa 922, 114 N.W.2d 45
(1962), the court interpreted a banking statute governing joint ac-
counts as not establishing the ownership of funds on deposit, rather as
intended solely for the protection of the bank. The statute did not
include language expressly creating a joint tenancy, however, and is
thus perhaps distinguishable from the West Virginia statute.
A recent Virginia decision ruled that oral evidence was admissible
to show the depositor's intent in creating a joint bank account,
Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 619, 125 S.E.2d 869 (1962). The
decedent had opened a savings account in his name and D's. It was
[Vol. 66
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shown that decedent was ill at the time and had wanted the joint ac-
count as a matter of convenience. The court discussed the essential
elements of an inter vivos gift and concluded that decedent had not
intended to create an immediate effective interest in D. It should
be observed here that, while there were general statutes cited relating
to joint tenancies and to the right of a bank to pay joint account funds
to either party, no statute existed which could be construed as giving
rise to any presumption that title vested in D with the deposit of funds
in a joint account. The court indicated that in order for an immediate
interest to be created in D during decedent's lifetime, some theory of
contract, trust, or gift would have to be relied upon.
An opposite view was presented in Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich.
127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958), where the court stated that the creation
of a joint bank account was a statutory means of vesting title to funds
in another, and that, although it resembles an inter vivos gift, it is not
a gift because the donor retains an element of control and the power
of revocation. The significant aspect of this case is that it deals with a
statute which, like New York's, is nearly identical with West Vir-
ginia's. The court held that the making of such a deposit was prima
facie evidence of the depositor's intention to vest title in the survivor.
The more fully considered cases seem to fall in line more with
Quesenberry v. Funk, supra, and to look for a gift or trust as a condi-
tion precedent to a joint tenancy. But where statutes worded in terms
of a joint tenancy are involved, cases generally discuss the creation of
the joint tenancy without delving into the gift or trust requirement.
10 AM. Jum. 2d Banks § 385 (1963).
To look again to West Virginia, it is to be observed that until cases
arise requiring the illumination of the gray areas suggested in this
comment, the nature of the property interests created by a joint bank
account must remain uncertain. It could well be that the New York
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